Judicial Modesty
Yesterday’s landmark decision in the DC gun ban case produced the anticipated hysterical reaction from the left. But it also provides a useful gauge to measure intellectual honesty.
Today’s Ledger op-ed section starkly demonstrates the difference between an honest liberal – Eugene Robinson – and a dishonest liberal – E.J. Dionne, both Washington Post columnists. From context, it appears that both share the same anti-freedom philosophy: given their druthers, they’d both ban, or severely restrict, civilian access to firearms. But Robinson admits the obvious: the Second Amendment intended to protect an individual right to bear arms. Dionne, contrariwise, accuses the Supreme Court majority of activism for (horrors!!) taking the language of the document seriously.
Alas, both Robinson and Dionne, good leftists, reject the notion that the Constitution actually means what it says and has a fixed, knowable, unchanging meaning. They both advocate for a "living" document; that is, one subject to ad hoc judicial amendment to arrive at politically correct results (in some cases). But Robinson, unlike Dionne, can’t get around the clear language of the document itself; apparently, he’s willing to expand constitutional provisions by judicial fiat, but not contract them.
The reactions of constitutional illiterates like Frank Lautenberg demonstrates clearly the necessity for judges bound by the text and history of the Constitution itself, not by an ideological devotion to arriving at the "right" result. If a case comes out "wrong", the good Senator avers that the problem must rest with "radical" judges, not the document itself. A good little leftist, Lautenberg cares only about results and, if the language of the Constitution seems to stand in the way, he’ll find judges willing to ignore it.
Liberals always advocate for "judicial modesty", as does Dionne, when a legislature impinges property rights or gun rights – which rights leftists consider inconvenient – but let a legislature impose a restriction on abortion – a right not even remotely mentioned in the document – and listen, in vain, for the left’s demands that the judiciary exercise "restraint".
Dionne accuses the Court of "activism" for enforcing a right clearly written into the document itself. Robinson, perhaps reluctantly, but correctly, concludes that, given the history of the country, the thought that the Framers would have entrusted a government with a monopoly on the use of force is absurd.
"Activism" is one of those Humpty-Dumpty words: it means whatever the user wishes it to mean. Conservatives apply it to decisions which depart from the text and history of the constitution; leftists employ it to describe a decision which arrives at the wrong result.
But "activism" is, of itself, not the problem. A court which refuses to act in the face of legislative usurpation of constitutional rights violates its job description every bit as clearly as does one which creates "rights" out of whole cloth. Only when a Court departs from the text and history of the document it purports to construe, so as to arrive at a desired result, does the "activist" label constitute a deprecation.
Put another way, when the Court invalidated attempts to prohibit a peaceful march through Skokie by the American Nazi Party, it "acted", invalidating attempts to silence an unpopular minority viewpoint. And quite properly so. Had it "modestly" refused to act, deferring to the popular will, the rights protected by the Constitution would be meaningless. The whole point of writing down provisions in a constitution is to remove those subjects from popular restriction.
Scalia wrote a masterful opinion. Therein, he nowhere contends that the provision is desirable; he simply sets forth what the people who adopted the provision understood it to mean. That "original understanding" binds judges today, because that’s what constitutions do. There is simply no way other than resort to that understanding to "interpret" a law. Doing otherwise changes courts from interpreters of law to creators of law, a role outside their job description, and one which impinges on the power reserved exclusively to the people.
Indeed, two days produced two fundamentally different opinions. In Heller, Scalia wrote a tract which relied wholly upon the text and history of the Constitution. Just the day before, in a case involving the imposition of capital punishment for child rapists, Justice Kennedy wrote a pitiable example of fluffy nonsense in which he asserted, in effect, that the meaning of the Constitution depends upon judicial interpretations of public opinion polls. ("Evolving standards of decency", words which, if employed by a judge, clearly demonstrate his unfitness for the office he holds.)
Or consider the recent California gay marriage case. The majority there invalidated a legislative enactment based upon a provision written before the Civil War, contending that it "must" be interpreted at a certain level of abstraction. Not that the people who wrote it or adopted it understood it that way, mind you, but because any other interpretation would produce results the majority disliked. Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, the California Court simply ignored the history of the document, making up the law as it went along. Unlike New Jersey, California voters may get a crack at correcting the errors of their black robed masters.
In Heller, Justice Stevens, in a display of rank silliness, contended that the majority " ... would have us believe that 200 years ago, the framers made a choice to limit the tools available to elected officials wishing to regulate civilian uses of weapons." That's precisely what the majority contended, and properly so. To demonstrate the absurdity of that statement, imagine that it contended that the majority " ... would have us believe that 200 years ago, the framers made a choice to limit the tools available to elected officials wishing to regulate newspapers." Or "... a choice to limit the tools available to elected officials wishing to combat criminal activity." "Limiting the tools" available to government is PRECISELY what the Bill of Rights was intended to do and it’s downright scary that four members of the highest court in the land believe that they can pick and choose which constitutional rights they will enforce, based upon nothing more substantive than their own quirky views of appropriate policy.
If the people object to the Second Amendment, they have a remedy: amend the Constitution. But until such time as it becomes the desire of the people to change it, we’re stuck with the constitution the Framers bequeathed us, and it is subject to neither judicial amendment nor legislative contravention.
And we should – MUST – choose judges who adhere to that view, not because the Framers, necessarily, got the policy right, but because the power to change the Constitution to meet modern exigencies – if change be necessary – rests EXCLUSIVELY with the people. Judges lack the power to change it based upon "evolving standards", public opinion polls, or international law.
THAT, Mr. Dionne, is "judicial modesty": adhering to the documents as they are written, not as the individual judge -- or the left -- might prefer them to read.
